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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court's jurisdiction over this appeal arises under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

In determining whether the district court properly dismissed Appellants'

claims, this Court may not consider facts contained in an affidavit that Appellants
submitted for the first time on a motion to reconsider the dismissal, especially where the
district court properly denied that motion.
Preservation/Standard of Review. This issue arises from Appellants' attempt to
bolster their appeal by using factual allegations that were not properly before the district
court. As discussed below, Appellants failed to argue in their opening brief that the
district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to reconsider, and therefore
that issue is waived on appeal. To the extent the denial of the motion to reconsider is
addressed, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re General Determination,
1999UT39,U22,982P.2d65.
2.

A comprehensive, all-encompassing settlement agreement between the

parties vitiates any claim Appellants might have to an interest in the Trust properties,
regardless of whether that interest is labeled a present, future, or testamentary interest.
Preservation/Standard of Review. This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing
on Appellee's motion to dismiss. R. 68, 75-167. The granting of a motion to dismiss is
reviewed for correctness on appeal, with the Court accepting the material allegations of
the complaint as true. McKeon v. Crump, 2002 UT App 258, ^ 5, 53 P.3d 494.

3.

Under the Settlement Agreement, Appellee Mona Vincent Lunceford is

entitled to an award of attorney's fees on all claims where she was the prevailing party.
Preservation/Standard of Review. Appellants' statement regarding preservation of
the attorney's fees issues and the standard of review on appeal is accurate and hereby
adopted. See Brief of Appellants ("Applts' Brf."), at 2.
IMPORTANT STATUTORY PROVISION
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) provides:
The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms
of the trust; or
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method
provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by:
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise
have passed according to the terms of the trust; or
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing
evidence of the settler's intent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Appellants Scott A. Lunceford and Debra Lunceford Harker (collectively,

"Appellants") appeal from the trial court's dismissal of their Complaint, in which they
asserted rights to properties in their deceased father's Trust. The father's surviving wife,
Appellee Mona Vincent Lunceford ("Mona"), maintains that Appellants' claims were
forever settled, waived, and released under the plain terms of a comprehensive settlement
agreement. On appeal, Appellants attempt to counter the plain meaning of that

2

agreement primarily with extrinsic evidence that was not considered during the dismissal
proceedings in the trial court and thus is not properly before this Court on appeal.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On October 14, 2003, Appellants filed their "Petition to Construe Rights Under a
Trust and Complaint for Damages, Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief and Related
Relief ("Complaint"). The Complaint sought to state the following causes of action:
1. Removal and Replacement of Trustee - seeking (a) to remove Mona as trustee of
the Trust and install in her place Appellant Scott Lunceford as trustee, (b) an
accounting and turnover of Trust assets, and (c) damages against Mona;
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty - seeking (a) an order declaring certain Trust-related
letters bearing Clyde's signature to be inauthentic, null, and void, and (b) damages
against Mona;
3. Injunction - seeking to enjoin Mona from acting as trustee or exercising any
control or dominion over Trust assets;
4. Declaratory Relief- seeking an order declaring "the rights, interests and
obligations of the parties to the Clyde Trust and its property," specifically that (a)
Appellants are entitled to be appointed as successor trustees under the Trust; and
(b) Appellants are each entitled to "a one-half interest" in the Trust assets.
Appellants attached to the Complaint the Trust and two amendments thereto.
On January 21, 2004, Mona filed an Answer and Counterclaim. R. 56. As an
affimiative defense, Mona asserted that Appellants had "waived, released and satisfied, in
whole or in part, all of the claims set forth in their Petition and Complaint." In her
Counterclaim, Mona described in detail a comprehensive Settlement Agreement and
mutual release between the parties and asserted that it precluded all of the claims in
Appellants' Complaint. R. 48-45. The Counterclaim sought damages for Appellants'

breach of the Settlement Agreement and attorney's fees as provided for by the
Agreement. R. 45-44.
On February 3, 20045 Appellants filed a reply to Mona's Counterclaim wherein
they admitted entering into the Settlement Agreement but denied that their current claims
were barred thereby. R. 65-64.
On March 22, 2004, Mona filed a motion to dismiss Appellants' Complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 68. ] The motion was based on
the argument that the Settlement Agreement - a copy of which was attached to the
memorandum in support - precluded Appellants' claims. R. 108-75. Mona also sought
attorney's fees as provided by the Settlement Agreement. R. 105, 89.
On April 2, 2004, Appellants filed their memorandum in opposition, contending
among other things that the Settlement Agreement unambiguously supported their right
to receive Trust assets. R. 124-14. At no point in their memorandum did they object to
the district court's consideration of the Settlement Agreement or suggest that the motion
to dismiss should be converted into a motion for summary judgment. Nor did they argue
that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous, that extraneous evidence was necessary to

1

Technically, Mona's motion was more properly characterized as a 12(c) motion, as she
had already filed a responsive pleading in the case, or perhaps as a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment since she had attached the Settlement Agreement. See Utah R. Civ.
P. 12(b). However, under Utah law the substance of a particular pleading or motion, and
not its caption, controls. See Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehab., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee
& Sports Med, 909 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah App. 1995) (stating, "'the incorrect title placed
upon the [motion] was not a bar to defendant's case'") (quoting Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1064-65 (Utah 1991)); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah
App. 1994) ("Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the pleading labels
chosen.").
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understand its terms, or that there were disputed issues of fact concerning its meaning or
application to this case. Instead, Appellants argued that the Settlement Agreement
unambiguously supported their position. On appeal, Appellants do not argue that the
district court erred by not converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.2
On June 22, 2004, the court heard oral argument on Mona's motion to dismiss. At
the hearing, Appellants did not argue or suggest that it was improper for the court to
consider the Settlement Agreement, that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous, or
that the motion to dismiss should be treated as a summary judgment motion. Rather,
Appellants restated the argument in their opposition memorandum that the Settlement
Agreement unambiguously supported their claims. R. 362-49 (Transcript of June 22,
2004 hearing, 30:18-22; and 44:9-12); R. 354, 351. During the oral argument, counsel
for Appellants unexpectedly suggested that the court allow Dayle Jeffs - a former Trustee
of the Trust who was present in the court room - to come forward and provide testimony
supporting Appellants' reading of the Settlement Agreement. R. 353. (Transcript pp. 3435). However, as this was not an evidentiary hearing, the trial court sustained the
objection of Mona's counsel and Mr. Jeffs was not permitted to testify. R. 353. After
oral argument, the court took the matter under advisement. R. 349.
One could argue that the district court should have converted Mona's 12(b)(6) motion
into a motion for summary judgment, but that would do nothing more than elevate
technical formalities over substance. Since the Settlement Agreement was the only
relevant evidence, and since each side argued that the Agreement was unambiguously in
its favor, formal conversion to a summary judgment motion would have yielded the same
result. Indeed, by entertaining both parties' arguments about the meaning of the
Settlement Agreement, the district court in effect did just that.

On July 1, 2004? the court issued its ruling dismissing Appellants' claims and
awarding Mona attorney's fees and costs. R. 191-82. In its decision, the court reiterated
each allegation of Appellants' Complaint, recited relevant provisions of the Settlement
Agreement, and held that "[t]he parties in this case clearly intend to make the Settlement
Agreement 'the final and complete expression of the agreement.'" R. 185. The court
held that under the plain language of the Agreement "[Appellants] cannot prove a set of
facts in support of their claims[.]" R. 183. The court's ruling dismissing all of
Appellants' claims was reduced to an order dated August 11, 2004. R. 260-57.
On August 24, 2004, Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, in which they argued
for the first time that "material issues of fact" existed as to the meaning of the Settlement
Agreement. R. 268-266. In support of the motion, Appellants attached a 10-page
affidavit from Mr. Jeffs ("Jeffs' affidavit") stating his opinion of the now-deceased
Clyde's understanding of the Settlement Agreement. R. 285-76. Appellants argued for
the first time that the district court had improperly considered the Settlement Agreement
in ruling on Mona's motion to dismiss, thereby converting her motion to dismiss into a
Rule 56 summary judgment motion without affording them additional discovery. R. 267,
289. Mona's opposition memorandum noted that "motions to reconsider" are not
recognized under the Rules (a point Appellants themselves acknowledged, R. 293) and,
in any event, that Appellants had waived their objection to the court's consideration of
the Settlement Agreement by repeatedly arguing that the Agreement supported their own
position and by never even suggesting that consideration of the Agreement was improper.
R. 375-70. Mona also argued that Appellants had never suggested that the Settlement
6

Agreement was ambiguous until their motion to reconsider and thus had waived that
argument too.3 R. 370-69.
On September 21, 2004, the court issued a ruling denying Appellants' motion to
reconsider. R. 402-400. That ruling was reduced to an order dated October 19, 2004. R.
427-25. On December 20, 2004, the district court entered its final order awarding Mona
attorney's fees and confirming the voluntarily dismissal of her Counterclaim. R. 478-69.
On January 5, 2005, Appellants filed their notice of appeal. R. 479-77.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Appellants' Statement of Facts Contains Factual Assertions That Are
Not Properly Before this Court and Highly Prejudicial.

Most of the factual assertions in Appellants' Statement of Facts are taken from the
10-page affidavit of M. Dayle Jeffs (the "Jeffs affidavit"), which Appellants submitted in
support of their unsuccessful Motion to Reconsider. But as demonstrated in the argument
section, the Jeffs affidavit was never proper evidence - Appellants cannot belatedly
smuggle facts into the record of the motion to dismiss simply by filing a motion for
reconsideration with a new affidavit. Referencing such allegations on appeal is improper
and highly prejudicial, especially because Mona never had a fair opportunity to dispute
them. This Court should ignore all allegations in Appellants' Statement of Facts based

In conjunction with her opposition memorandum, Mona filed a motion to strike the
Jeffs' Affidavit. R. 339-37. The Motion to Strike was eventually denied by Judge Pullan,
who was assigned to the case sometime after Judge Davis issued his rulings and orders
granting Mona's Motion to Dismiss and denying Appellants' Motion to Reconsider.
Judge Pullan issued a ruling on December 20, 2004, stating that it would be
"inappropriate . . . to strike a pleading filed in support of [Appellants' Motion to
Reconsider] that has previously been ruled upon by this Court." R. 470.

on the Jeffs affidavit, including allegations concerning Jeffs' interactions with Clyde and
his opinions about the parties' subjective intent. (Generally speaking, any allegation
supported principally by a citation to pages 285-276 should be disregarded.)
The following statement of facts draws solely from the sources the parties actually
submitted to the district court in arguing the Motion to Dismiss: the Complaint,
including associated exhibits, and the Settlement Agreement.
2.

Facts that may properly be considered on appeal.

The Parties. Before his death, Clyde M. Lunceford ("Clyde") was the husband of
Mona Vincent Lunceford ("Mona"), and the father by a prior marriage of Appellants
Scott A. Lunceford ("Scott") and Debra Lunceford Harker ("Debra"). R. 37, U 9.
The Trust. On December 3, 1999, and then again in a restatement dated July 21,
2000, Clyde as settlor established the Clyde M. Lunceford Trust ("Trust"). R. 23-10; 84.
Under the July 2000 restatement, Clyde appointed himself as Trustee, with Scott and then
Debra to serve (in that order) as successor trustees in the event Clyde died, resigned, or
otherwise could not serve. R. 19. The purpose of the Trust was to hold property and
assets for Clyde's own benefit during his lifetime and for the Trust beneficiaries upon his
death. R. 23 et seq. The initial corpus of the Trust - the "Trust Estate" - consisted of a
condominium located in Coronado, San Diego County, California ("Coronado
Condominium") and Clyde's personal residence with associated property in Orem, Utah
("Clyde Residence"). R. 23, 84. The Trust document also provided for the
administration and distribution of other properties that might later be transferred into the
Trust and become part of the Trust Estate. R. 23, 21.
8

Under the terms of the July 2000 restatement, the beneficiaries of the Trust were
to be Mona, Scott, and Debra. The Trust document directed that upon Clyde's death
Mona would be gifted a life estate in the Coronado Condominium, with the exclusive
right to the property's income and payment from the Trust of taxes and various costs and
expenses. R. 21-20. The remaining balance of the Trust Estate was to be distributed
equally to Scott and Debra. See R. 20.
As trustor, Clyde reserved the right to revoke part or all of the Trust, to add other
properties to the Trust Estate, to change the beneficiaries and their respective shares, and
to amend the Trust. R. 21. Following the July 2000 restatement, Clyde executed two
amendments to the Trust. In the First Amendment, executed on December 11, 2000,
Clyde amended Article Seven, Paragraph 7.1 of the trust and reinstalled himself as
Trustee. R. 8. He then amended Article Seven, Paragraph 7.2(a) so as to appoint Mona
as successor trustee in the event of his death, incapacity, resignation and so forth. R. 8.
In the Second Amendment, executed on August 20, 2001, Clyde again amended Article
Seven, Paragraph 7.1, this time to appoint Jeffs as trustee. R. 5. He did not amend
Article Seven, Paragraph 7.2(a), which deals with successor trustees. The effect of the
First Amendment was to install Mona as successor trustee in the place of Appellants.
The effect of the Second Amendment was to install Jeffs as trustee in the place of Clyde.
Disputes between Clyde and Appellants and Threats of Litigation. Clyde,
Appellants, and to a lesser degree Mona were involved in a complex web of financial
arrangements entailing a variety of legal entities, properties, and transactions - the Trust
being just one of these. See R. 85-84. The many details of these arrangements are not

important to this appeal. What is important is that by January 2002 the personal and
business relationships between Clyde and Mona on the one hand and Appellants on the
other had deteriorated to such an extent that extensive litigation was threatened over a
large number of disputed issues and claims. R. 84-83 (detailing some of the potential
claims between the parties).
The Settlement Agreement. Instead of litigating, on January 22, 2002 the parties
entered into a comprehensive, all-encompassing Settlement Agreement. Drafted by
counsel for Appellants. R. 162. The fundamental purpose of the Agreement was to
forever resolve and release all current or potential claims related to "the parties' dealings
with one another from the beginning of time to the date of execution of [the] Agreement."
R. 81.
Recitals Regarding Parties & Basic Facts. The parties to the Agreement
were Clyde (individually and as settlor of the Trust), Mona, Scott and his wife Rebecca,
Deborah and her husband Richard, Jeffs as trustee of the Trust, and various family
business entities. R. 85. Among other things, the recitals of the Settlement Agreement
acknowledge that:
•

Clyde established the Trust.

•

Clyde "acquired ownership" of the Coronado Condominium and the
Clyde Residence.

•

Mona is married to Clyde. Prior to their marriage, Clyde and Mona
entered into an "Antenuptial Agreement dated August 26, 1980,"
which "gives to Mona certain distribution rights in Clyde's estate
upon Clyde's death."

•

The Trust currently owns the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde
Residence.

10

R.84.
Recitals Regarding Various Disputes and Potential Claims: The Agreement
acknowledges that "[c]ertain disputes arose between the parties to this agreement, and
although litigation was threatened, litigation has not been commenced." R. 84. It then
sets out a lengthy but non-exhaustive list of potential claims and grievances among the
parties. The following potential claims are the most relevant to this appeal:
•

Claims by Appellants that Mona "exercised improper and undue
influence over Clyde to their prejudice as the natural heirs of Clyde
and otherwise improperly interfered with family business affairs";
and

•

Claims by Appellants "of entitlement to present or immediate testamentary
interests in the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence."

R. 83.
Desire to Settle, Waive, and Release Claims and Disputes: The Agreement
recognizes that "[e]ach of the parties has denied the Claims asserted against them by the
other parties and have vigorously denied and defended, at all times, all Claims asserted
against them." Id. at p. 3. The Agreement states that the parties are "mindful of the
uncertainty and expense of further disputes and litigation of disputed claims," and that the
parties have thus "reached certain terms of settlement of their claims and disputes with
respect to the Claims and other matters related to the Claims by them." Id.
Covenants and Agreements: The Agreement then spells out the terms of
the settlement. In exchange for Clyde giving up his interest in a family limited liability
company ("LLC") and partnership, the parties agreed that the LLC would pay him a
specific sum of money. R. 82,fflf1-2. Mona also relinquished any rights or claims she

may have had to any "business entity of the Lunceford family." Id., *h 6. The Agreement
then contains a release of any rights Appellants may have to the Coronado Condominium
and the Clyde Residence, including "any claim, rights or title in and to" those properties,
together with a requirement that Scott and his wife quit claim to the Trust "any right, title
or interest" they may have in condominium. R. 82, ^ 4.
The Agreement also reaffirms Clyde's right to dispose of his property as he sees
fit and ensures that Mona's rights under a prenuptial agreement with Clyde are not
modified except as expressly provided in the Agreement:
No Restriction on Right of Disposition. This Agreement shall not,
in any manner, restrict, impair, or limit Clyde's right or ability to distribute
any of his property by lifetime transfer, will or other testamentary
disposition, or in any other manner, to any person or persons of his
choosing. Except as provided in paragraph 6 [in which Mona waived her
rights to certain family business entities], this Agreement shall not serve to
limit or modify Mona's rights under the Prenuptial Agreement with respect
to the separate property of Clyde Lunceford as constituted after execution
and performance of this Agreement.
R. 82, Tf 5.
Despite these specific provisions, the heart of the Settlement Agreement is a
comprehensive reciprocal release of all potential liability among the parties. Its great
detail, sweeping language, and intentional redundancy demonstrate that it was intended to
be all-encompassing. The release states in full:
General Reciprocal Release. For and in consideration of the
execution of this Agreement and the covenants, promises and performance
of this Agreement, and except for the obligations of this Agreement, the
parties hereto, and each of them, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of
any and all other agents, successors, attorneys, assigns, representatives,
employees, officers, directors, insurers, members, managers, partners,
spouses and heirs, and others, do hereby release andforever acquit and
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discharge each other and any and all other individual and collective past,
present, and future officers, directors, parents, subsidiaries, shareholders,
affiliates, partners, attorneys, agents, members, managers, associates, past
members, past associates, former employees, spouses, partners and heirs,
and all other persons or entities for whose conduct any or all of the
foregoing may be liable under any theory of law or equity, of and from any
and all liability, rights, claims, commission or other compensation,
demands, obligations, damages, losses, injuries, costs, expenses, attorney
fees, all actions, causes of action, controversies of any nature of any kind
or description whatsoever, existing, or arising out of related to or based
upon the parties' dealings with one another from the beginning of time to
the date of execution of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, all
known damages, losses, actions, and causes of action arising out of or
related to the Claims, and all asserted and threatened claims, and any
related claims described in the Recitals herein above, the same which are
herein incorporated by reference and made and acknowledged as material
terms of this Agreement. These releases include, but are not limited to,
claims between Scott and [his wife] and Debra and [her husband] related to
Debra's handling of certain Merrill Lynch accounts or other LLC or LP
accounts. Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, this general release
paragraph is not intended to release any claims based upon the obligations
of this Agreement or any act, omission or mater which occurs after the date
of execution of this Agreement.
Id., Tf 9 (emphasis added.)
The paragraph following the reciprocal release reiterates the release's sweeping
nature and specifies that even unknown material facts cannot affect its scope or
effectiveness:
Unknown Facts. It is expressly agreed and understood that to the
extent stated above, the Agreement releases losses, injuries, damages, and
claims of every kind and character the parties have or may have against
each and all other persons or entities from the beginning of time to the date
of execution of this Agreement, for whose conduct they may be liable,
arising from or related to the claims and offenses stated in the Recitals
above, and arising from or related to the Claims. The parties also
acknowledge that they may hereafter discover facts which occurred from
the beginning of time to the date of execution of this Agreement, which are
different from, or in addition to, those which they now know to be true, or
matters which underlay the Claims or the potential claims of the parties'

alleged injuries, losses or damages, and agree that this Agreement and the
release contained herein be and remain effective in all respects
notwithstanding such different or additional facts or the discovery thereof
The parties expressly waive the benefit of any statute or rule of law, if any,
which might otherwise limit the scope of this Agreement because of
unknown matter existing from the beginning of time to the date of
execution of this Agreement, whether material or otherwise.
R. 81-80, \ 10 (emphasis added.)
In addition to other technical sections, the Settlement Agreement contains two
more provisions of interest. First, it contains an attorney's fees provisions providing that
if "any action or proceeding is brought" to enforce any provision of the Agreement, "the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its/his/her costs and reasonable attorney's
fees . . . . " R. 80-79, \ 17. Lastly, the Agreement contains a broad integration clause
ensuring that no other sources of interpretation are used to determine the nature of the
parties' agreement and understanding:
Integration and Entire Agreement. This Agreement sets forth the
entire agreement and understanding between and among the parties hereto
with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior written
and oral agreements, term sheets, negotiations and understandings; shall be
binding upon the successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives of
the parties, and may not be rescinded, cancelled, terminated, supplemented,
amended, or modified in any manner whatsoever without the prior written
consent of all parties.
R. 7 9 4 18.
Clyde's Death and Aftermath. Clyde died in February 2003. R. 36, lj 13. In
October 2003, Jeffs resigned as Trustee of the Trust. R. 33, H 29; 277, H 29. Mona
maintains that, under the successor trustee provision of the First Amendment to the Trust,
she is now the rightful Trustee. Appellants disagree, claiming that Scott and then Debra
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are the successor trustees. R. 36, 117. Mona and Appellants disagree about other issues
concerning the administration and distribution of the Trust and its assets.
Allegations in Appellants' Complaint.
On October 14, 2003 Appellants filed their action against Mona seeking damages
and equitable relief. R. 39. Appellants allege that Scott and then Debra, seriatim, are the
rightful successor trustees to the Trust. R. 37-36. They claim that since Clyde's death
Mona has consumed all the rental income on the Coronado Condominium, that she has
not properly accounted to the Trust or Appellants for her use of and benefit from Trust
assets, that she is engaging in self-dealing, that she has conflicts of interest which
disqualify her from serving as Trustee, and that she is acting in a manner that will cause
irreparable harm to the Trust and Appellants. R. 35, 32-31, 29. They further assert that
Mona's claims against the Trust for amounts owing under her prenuptial agreement with
Clyde and for medical and other expenses she incurred while caring for Clyde before his
death are not properly charged to the Trust but rather to some separate and unidentified
"Estate" purportedly created upon Clyde's death. R. 36-35.
The Complaint also challenges the validity of two letters by which Clyde made
Mona the sole beneficiary of the Trust, claiming such letters are either not authentic or
were obtained by Mona's duress or overreaching. R. 34-33. Appellants claim the letters
do not amend the Trust. R. 33. Lastly, Appellants make a number of allegations
pertaining to Jeffs and his conduct as Trustee. R. 33-32.

STATEMENT REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THIS APPEAL
The scope of this appeal is relatively narrow. Although the first issue is broadly
phrased as whether the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss, Appellants
limit their actual argument to establishing one of two points: (1) that the Settlement
Agreement on its face did not void their right to eventually inherit the Coronado
Condominium and the Clyde Residence via the Trust, or (2) that the Agreement is
ambiguous on this point, requiring a remand and further proceedings. See Applts' Brf, at
25-30. Appellants make no effort to defend the other claims in their Complaint,
including claims (1) that Mona cannot or should not serve as the successor Trustee and
that Scott or Debra should be installed in her place, (2) that certain Trust or propertyrelated documents are invalid due to Mona's alleged undue influence over Clyde, (3) that
Mona has improperly used rental income, and (4) that Appellants are entitled to damages
against Mona. Because Appellants chose not to defend these and other distinct claims on
appeal, if a remand is necessary this Court should clearly instruct the district court that
additional proceedings must focus solely on whether the Settlement Agreement voided
Appellants' Trust-based interests in the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde
Residence. Of course, in making this statement, Mona seeks only to clarify the scope of
this appeal and in no way suggests that such a remand is necessary. To the contrary, as
demonstrated below, the district court's decision was correct and should be affirmed on
appeal.

16

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case turns on the meaning of the Settlement Agreement. Before that meaning
can be determined, however, this Court must first decide which documents are properly
before it on appeal. Appellants' statement of facts and argument rely heavily on
the Jeffs affidavit. But that document is not properly before the Court. Appellants
submitted the Jeffs affidavit in support of their motion to reconsider the granting of
Mona's motion to dismiss. Utah law does not even recognize motions to reconsider for
that purpose. And in any event, under these circumstances a party cannot supplement the
appellate record of a dispositive motion by submitting new evidence on a motion to
reconsider. The district court properly denied the motion to reconsider - a point not truly
contested on appeal - and thus the Jeffs affidavit must be ignored. Accordingly, this
Court may consider only those documents that the district court considered on the motion
to dismiss.
Excluding the Jeffs affidavit and associated allegations narrows the scope of the
analysis considerably. Although Appellants argue that the Court must look to extrinsic
evidence in interpreting the Settlement Agreement, in fact there is no extrinsic evidence
to consider once the Jeffs affidavit is excluded. In the trial court, both sides agreed that
the Agreement is unambiguous and capable of being construed according to its plain
meaning, and on appeal this Court should do just that. The plain language of the
Agreement demonstrates that Appellants' interests in the Trust and/or its corpus whether denominated as present, future, testamentary or otherwise - were terminated by
the parties' all-encompassing settlement. Appellants specifically released "any claim" or

"right" to the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence. Then, they agreed to a
sweeping provision that vitiated all possible interests "related to" their claims to such
properties, which necessarily included alleged Trust-based interests.
The practical effect of the Settlement Agreement was either to amend the disputed
Trust to remove Scott and Debra as beneficiaries or, alternatively, to leave them as Trust
beneficiaries but revoke their interests in the specific condominium and residence
properties held by the Trust. Either way, the Settlement Agreement terminated any claim
Appellants could possibly have to the Trust's current assets. This reading of the
Agreement is consistent with its plain meaning and with documents Clyde signed (and
which Appellants submitted to the district court during the motion to dismiss
proceedings) showing his intent to leave these properties to his wife Mona rather than to
Appellants. The district court's dismissal of the Complaint should be affirmed.
Finally, if Mona wins on appeal the parties agree that under the Settlement
Agreement she is entitled to her attorney's fees. But even if this Court reverses, she will
still be entitled to at least some attorney's fees since she prevailed in the district court on
various claims that Appellants have chosen not to defend on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Must Ignore The Allegations In The Jeffs Affidavit.
As noted, most of the assertions in the factual section of Appellants' brief are

taken from the Jeffs affidavit, which Appellants submitted in support of their Motion to
Reconsider. But the Jeffs affidavit is not properly before this Court on appeal and thus
must be ignored. Neither general appellate practice nor the specific circumstances of this
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case justifies Appellants' attempt to insert additional facts into the record after losing the
motion to dismiss.
A.

As a General Rule, Evidence Submitted to Support an Unsuccessful
Motion to Reconsider Does Not Become Part of the Factual Record on
Appeal.

This is an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss. The "well-established
rule of appellate law [is] that a reviewing court considers only the evidence that the trial
court had before it." Franks v. The Lima News, 672 N.E.2d 2455 247 (Ohio App. 1996);
Prattv. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Company, 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah App. 1991).
Here, the evidence before the trial court on the motion to dismiss was the Complaint with
associated exhibits and the Settlement Agreement. The parties did not present or argue
any other evidence to the district court; those were the only documents before the district
court when it made its decision.
After losing the motion to dismiss based on that record, Appellants attempted to
introduce new evidence into the record in the form of the Jeffs affidavit. But as the Tenth
Circuit recognized when faced with a similar situation, appellate courts "do not consider
[such an] affidavit on appeal... because [the] plaintiff cannot get a second chance to
present the facts on a motion to reconsider." Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 31 F.3d 958,
961 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994). A motion to reconsider is not an opportunity for the losing party
to lard up the appellate record with evidence and arguments that it failed to present to the
trial court in a dispositive motion proceeding. Unless the trial court considers and
expressly bases its dispositive ruling on the new evidence, it is standard practice for
appellate courts to ignore it. See, e.g., Franks, 672 N.E.2d at 247 (because the appellate

court considers only what the trial court ruled on, it "[does] not consider any part of
appellants' motion for reconsideration.").4 That is exactly what this Court should do here
with the Jeffs affidavit and the facts in Appellants' brief that rely on it.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the hostility of Utah's appellate courts
toward motions to reconsider. Indeed, such a motion does not even exist for the purpose
that Appellants sought to use it. As the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have
repeatedly emphasized, so-called "motions to reconsider" are nowhere recognized in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and are proper only if they could have been brought under
some other rule - in other words, a "motion to reconsider" is allowed only if it really
should have been labeled something else that the Rules actually permit. See, e.g., Wisden
v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1995) (motions to reconsider "not provided for
4

See also Quinto v. Cross and Peters Co., 547 N.W.2d 314, 319 n.5 (Mich. 1996)
("Plaintiff also relies on a second affidavit, filed after the trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary disposition.... This second affidavit was not before the trial court.
The affidavit was filed with a motion for rehearing, after the trial court granted
defendant's dispositive motion. In ruling on the motion for summary disposition, a court
considers the evidence then available to it. Accordingly, in ruling on the propriety of the
trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary disposition, we do not consider the
second affidavit.") (emphasis in original; citation omitted); Kibunja v. Alturas, L.L.C,
856 A.2d 1120, 1128. (D.C. 2004) (affidavit filed in support of unsuccessful "motion for
reconsideration" of summary judgment came "too late for it to be of any use to
[appellants] on appeal, since [the appellate court] may only consider facts that were
before the trial court at the time it ruled."); see also Hayes v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 25
Fed.Appx. 308, 313 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished decision) ("On appeal, Hayes repeats the
arguments he made in support of his motion for reconsideration, many of which were
made for the first time in conjunction with the motion for reconsideration and are based
upon the deposition testimony and affidavit of Dr. Hanna - evidence that was not
submitted to the district court until after summary judgment was granted on the basis of
the relevant statute of limitations. As a result, we will address them in relation only to
the motion to reconsider and not to our review of the district court's decision to grant
summary judgment to Norfolk Southern."). (A copy of this case is attached as Exhibit
"A.")
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under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and [have] never been recognized as a proper
motion in this state").5 Unfortunately for Appellants, a request that the trial court
reconsider its ruling on a dispositive motion based on evidence that a party simply failed
to submit does not fit that exception; the post-trial or post-judgment motions allowed by
the Rules are not for that purpose.6
B.

In Any Event, the District Court Properly Denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and Thus the Jeffs Affidavit Cannot Be Considered.

Two additional reasons militate against considering the Jeffs affidavit. First,
Appellants do not argue why the denial of their motion for reconsideration was incorrect
and thus on appeal the issue has been waived and the denial must be presumed proper.
To be sure, Appellants pose that issue in their statement of issues, as if it will be an
important part of their brief. See Applts' Brf., at 1-2. But never once do they argue that
the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.7 That issue is waived.

5

See also J. V. Hatch Const, Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 11 (Utah App. 1998) (motions
characterized as "motions to reconsider" may properly be heard only if they "could have
been brought under a different rule . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure"); Salt Lake
Knee & Sports Rehab, v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Med., 909 P.2d 266, 268-69 n.2
(Utah App. 1995) (concluding motion characterized as "motion to reconsider" tolled time
for filing appeal because it was substantively a motion for a new trial, but warning that
"we are not approving the use of pleadings identified as something not provided for in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure").
In a footnote in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, Appellants
implausibly asserted that their Motion "can be treated as [a] post-judgment motion[]
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) or 59(e)," whereas in their docketing
statement to this Court Appellants stated that "[tjhere have been no motions filed
pursuant to rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." On appeal,
Appellants have made no effort to link their motion to reconsider with motions the Rules
expressly permit, nor to satisfy any of the requirements imposed by the Rules.
Likewise, although Appellants argued in their Motion to Reconsider that the trial court
should have considered the Jeffs affidavit because it had improperly converted Mona's

Pixton v. State Farm, 809 P.2d 746, 751 Utah App. 1991) ("[w]here an appellant fails to
brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived.")
Second, and in all events, the district court properly denied the motion for
reconsideration. In reality, Appellants' motion to reconsider was an attempt to take a
new and better bite at the proverbial apple. The motion sought reconsideration based on
new arguments that supposedly required consideration of extrinsic evidence, like the
Jeffs' affidavit. But by the time of the motion, Appellants had already waived any
argument that the trial court should expand its analysis beyond the Complaint and
Settlement Agreement. In all the briefing and oral argument leading to the trial court's
decision, Appellants never once argued that consideration of the Settlement Agreement
was improper or insufficient to decide the motion. Instead, they strenuously argued that
the Agreement supported their claims. R. 121-15. In fact, Appellants submitted two of
their own documents for the court's consideration, demonstrating that they felt perfectly
free to submit additional evidence but had simply chosen not to do so based on the nature

Motion to Dismiss into a Rule 56 motion (R. 297, 290-89), Appellants fail to argue this
issue on appeal and have therefore abandoned it. See Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza,
923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996) (declining to address identical argument for failure to
argue on appeal). Moreover, as in Hebertson, "nothing in the record .. . indicates that
[Appellants] ever asked for [additional] time or discovery" in response to Mona
submitting the Settlement Agreement in support of her motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, all
parties argued for their respective positions based on the Settlement Agreement. R. 10388; 121-15; 166-53. In addition to not being raised on appeal, any argument that Mona's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion was improperly converted into a Rule 56 motion was waived long
ago at the trial court level.
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of their arguments. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny
Appellants the chance to present new and inconsistent arguments and additional evidence
in a motion to reconsider. Indeed, the district court should have granted Mona's motion
to strike the Jeffs affidavit. See R. 347-41 (motion to strike briefing).
In sum, this Court should not consider evidence that Appellants submitted to
support a motion to reconsider that they no longer defend on appeal and that, in any
event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying. The Jeffs affidavit is
highly prejudicial and not part of the record on appeal. Thus, it and all allegations that
rely on it should be ignored.
II.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Settlement Agreement
Bars Appellants' Claims To An Interest In The Trust Or Its Assets.
The plain terms of the Settlement Agreement dictate the outcome of this appeal.

The trial court correctly interpreted its sweeping releases and concluded that Appellants'
claims to an interest in the Trust or its assets are barred.
A.

Appellants' Arguments About the Use of Extrinsic Evidence Are
Misplaced; In Any Event, There Is No Extrinsic Evidence to Consider
in this Case and the Argument Was Not Preserved for Appeal.

On appeal, Appellants expend a great deal of effort trying to establish that Utah
law requires a court to consider extrinsic evidence when determining whether a contract
is ambiguous. See Applts' Brf., at 18-23. But as the Tenth Circuit (Judge McConnell)
recently noted, "Utah law is unsettled on the issue whether the court may go beyond the

o

Appellants attached to their Complaint the Trust and two amendments to the Trust, 2305 and Appellants attached to their Memorandum in Opposition to Ms. Lunceford's
Motion to Dismiss two 2001 letters signed by Clyde Lunceford. R. 112-09.
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four comers of the contract to determine whether the contract is ambiguous." Flying J
Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 405 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005). In reality, the cases
go both ways.9 At any rate, Appellants' view - that a court must consider any and all
extrinsic evidence at the outset to determine whether the contract contains an ambiguity
that must in turn be resolved through consideration of extrinsic evidence - is hopelessly
circular and impractical; whatever else, Utah law can't mean that.
If applied as they suggest under facts like these, Appellants' approach would
generate huge uncertainty and make summary disposition in contract cases virtually
impossible; after all, such cases nearly always involve disputes over what a contract
means. The Jeffs' affidavit is filled with allegations of what Jeffs - acting principally as
Clyde's personal attorney - thinks the Settlement Agreement means. R. 285-76. Why
that should matter in determining the intentions of Clyde, Mona and Appellants is a
mystery. The Jeffs affidavit also provides Jeffs' subjective understanding of Clyde's
subjective understanding of the Settlement Agreement. R. 281, \ 14. Under that

9

Compare WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002)
("If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties'
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law."), and Central Fla. Investments, Inc. v.
ParkWest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002) ("We first look to the four corners of
the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties."), with Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78
P.3d 600, 601 (Utah 2003) (in determining ambiguity, the court may consider "[rjelevant,
extrinsic evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the
[contract])" (brackets in original) {quoting Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 20 P.3d 287 (Utah 2001)), Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918 , 925
(Utah 2002). ("In determining whether a contract is ambiguous the court is not bound to
consider only the language of the contract."), and Ward v. Intermountain Farmers' Ass'n,
907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) ("When determining whether a contract is ambiguous,
any relevant evidence must be considered.").
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approach, Mona's understanding of what her husband intended would likewise be
admissible, as would the views of any attorney, paralegal, law clerk, secretary - or any
other person - who heard or participated in the negotiations or spoke with the parties
about the Agreement before or after the fact. But such evidence is simply not admissible.
Pepper v. State, 558 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Indiana App. 1990) ("A witness cannot speculate
on the thought processes of another.") Appellants' approach is a recipe for total
confusion.
It is highly doubtful that even the most liberal reading of Utah's precedents would
support Appellants' use of the Jeffs affidavit. Frankly, it makes little sense for a court to
consider parol evidence in a case like this where the contract is fully integrated and the
terms are clear. R. 79. See Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 361, *{ 17, 58 P.3d 854
("The parol evidence rule operates in the absence of fraud to exclude [prior and]
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.") (internal quotation marks
omitted; bracketed language in original). A different conclusion might be in order if
there were some suggestion that the parties intended to give a word or phrase a private or
unique meaning that differs from ordinary usage. See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (extrinsic
evidence appropriate to determine if "the parties chose the language of the agreement to
express a different meaning" than the plain terms would suggest). However, Appellants
didn't submit the Jeffs affidavit for that purpose. As Appellants' themselves argued in
the trial court, the terms of the Agreement are plain and unambiguous. See Applts' Brf,
at 23-24 (acknowledging that "both parties argued that the Settlement Agreement was

unambiguous" in the trial court proceedings on the motion to dismiss). What the parties
dispute - and what Appellants seek to use the Jeffs affidavit to argue - is the legal effect
of those terms. That goes far beyond Ward's allowance of extrinsic evidence "so that the
court can place itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the
time of contracting." 907 P.2d at 268. Appellants' approach would vitiate the parol
evidence rule and fatally undermine the contract as the agreed-upon expression of the
parties' intent.
But even assuming Appellants' views on extrinsic evidence are correct, in this
case the point is irrelevant. As explained, Appellants never presented extrinsic evidence
to the trial court on the issue of ambiguity: whether or not admissible, the Jeffs affidavit
was never submitted to the district court on the motion to dismiss. Indeed, Appellants
never even raised the issue of extrinsic evidence during the motion to dismiss
proceedings. Thus, even under the most liberal reading of the cases, the simple fact is
that the district court was not asked to consider extrinsic evidence and had none before it
when deciding whether the Settlement Agreement precludes Appellants' claims.
Moreover, at no time in the trial court briefing or hearing on the motion to dismiss did
Appellants argue that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous, a point they now
concede on appeal. Applts' Brf., at 18, 23-24. Rather, Appellants merely pressed the
district court to adopt their own interpretation of the contract. R. 124-14. Only much
later, in the proceedings on their motion to reconsider, did Appellants argue ambiguity or
the need for extrinsic evidence (R. 292), but by then the argument had been waived. R.
373-69.
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Thus, the whole question of when and to what extent extrinsic evidence may be
used to establish and deal with contractual ambiguities is academic. Given the arguments
and evidence in the trial court and how Appellants have elected to argue their appeal, the
only issue before this Court is whether - based on the language contained within the four
corners of the document and the allegations in the Complaint - the trial court properly
interpreted the Settlement Agreement. That is how the parties argued the issue in the
court below and that is how it must be addressed on appeal.
B.

The Plain Language of the Settlement Agreement Vitiates Appellants'
Interest in the Trust.

This appeal rises or falls depending on the scope of the Settlement Agreement.
Since there is no extrinsic evidence to consider, how broadly the Agreement sweeps must
be determined from its plain language.
1.

Utah Law Strongly Favors Settlements; Parties Will Be Held to
Their Voluntary Agreements to Resolve Legal Disputes.

Before demonstrating why the Settlement Agreement bars Appellants' claims, it is
worth reiterating that Utah law strongly favors settlements. Utah courts have repeatedly
affirmed that "'settlements are favored in the law, and should be encouraged.'" Ostler v.
Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (quoting Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v.
Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979)); accord, e.g., Zions First Nat 7 Bank v.
Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating same). This is
'"because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to the judicial
system.'" Murray v. State, 131 P.2d 1000, 1000 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted). Utah
law especially favors settlements in cases - such as this one - involving family disputes.

In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17,1(23, 71 P.3d 589 ("Since family settlement agreements
are 'favorites of the law,' it is the general policy to encourage these types of
agreements."). Accordingly, an "accepted stipulated settlement agreement...
constitute^] a binding and enforceable contract between the parties." Brighton Corp. v.
Ward, 2001 UT App 236,^24, 31 P.3d 594; accord Murray, 737 P.2d at 1001 (analyzing
enforceability of settlement agreement according to "basic and long-established
principle^] of contract law").
2.

By Entering the Settlement Agreement Appellants Relinquished
Any Interest They Had in the Coronado Condominium, the Clyde
Residence, and the Trust.

The best place to begin analyzing the Settlement Agreement is with the parties. At
the time the Agreement was executed, the members of the Lunceford family were on the
verge of suing each other over grievances arising out of a tangled web of business
transactions and personal arrangements. R. 84-83. To avoid litigation and resolve these
disputes once and for all, the Settlement Agreement included everyone: Clyde and
Mona; Scott, Debra, and their spouses; various family business entities; and the Trust, as
represented by its settlor (Clyde) and its Trustee (Jeffs). R. 85.
Although the intent was to resolve the entire universe of potential claims among
the parties, the Agreement nevertheless contains a list of grievances. R. 84-83. By its
own terms, the list was not exhaustive ("disputes include, but are not limited to, the
following" (R. 84)), but it does highlight some of the parties' principal complaints. One
of the stated claims lies at the heart of this appeal. Prior to the settlement, Appellants
believed they had claims "against Clyde and Mona of entitlement to present or immediate
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testamentary interests in the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence." R. 83
(reciting potential claim; emphasis added). That is, Scott and Debra claimed a present
interest in those properties (a present right of use or possession) and also a "testamentary"
interest. The term "testamentary" pertains to "a disposition of property at death" and thus
necessarily refers to the future when the property owner has passed away. Black's Law
Dictionary 1474 (6th Ed. 1990).
A paper, instrument, document, gift, appointment, etc., is said to be
"testamentary" when it is written or made so as not to take effect until after
the death of the person making it, and to be revocable [so that the person]
retain[s] the property under his control during his life, although he may
have believed that it would operate as an instrument of a different character.
Id. At the time of the Agreement, the only "testamentary interests" Appellants had in the
Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence were through the Trust: they were
beneficiaries under the Trust, which owned the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde
Residence. R. 84,ffi[D, E, H.
With the parties defined and illustrative claims identified, the Covenants and
Agreements ("C&A") section of the Settlement Agreement contains provisions designed
to resolve targeted issues and then a general reciprocal release that serves as a catch-all to
cover everything else. Paragraph 4 of the C&A section contains a release of Appellants'
interests in the Coronado Condominium and Clyde Residence:
Release of Claims to Condominium and Residence. Scott [and his
spouse and] Debra [and her spouse], individually and collectively, release
any claim, rights or title in and to the Clyde Residence and the Coronado
Condominium. Clyde, and the Trustee, acknowledge delivery by Scott and
[his spouse] of a quit claim deed to the Coronado Condominium
transferring to the Trustee for the Trust, any right, title or interest of Scott
and [his spouse] in the record title to the Coronado Condominium.

R. 82, ^ 4 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement acknowledges that Appellants claim both
"present" and "testamentary" (i.e., future Trust-related) interests in the condominium and
residence, and then provides a clear and unequivocal release of all such interests and
claims. Because Paragraph 4 voids "any claim" or "rights" Appellants may have to the
condominium and residence it necessarily voids any testamentary claim or interest.
Assuming something remained of Appellants' "testamentary interests" after
paragraph 4, any interest in those properties was completely vitiated by what may well be
the most comprehensive general release ever drafted. See R. 81, ^ 9. Except for
obligations created or restated in the Settlement Agreement itself, paragraph 9 of the
C&A section (quoted in full above) wipes out all of Appellants' potential claims against
Clyde, Mona, and the Trust. Even stripped of many of its redundantly expansive terms,
the language could hardly be more sweeping:
[T]he parties... [agreed to] release and forever acquit.. . each other . . .
and all other persons or entities for whose conduct any or all of the
foregoing may be liable . . . of and from any and all liability, rights, claims,
.. . demands, obligations,. . . causes of action, . . ., existing, or arising out
of, related to or based upon the parties' dealings with one another from the
beginning of time to the date of execution of this Agreement, including, but
not limited to, all known . . . causes of action arising out of or related to the
Claims, and all asserted and threatened claims, and any related claims
described in the Recitals . . . .
R. 81,1(9.
There is no question that Appellants' current claims against Mona and the Trust
"aris[e] out of or [are] related to [their] Claims" - restated in paragraph I, 8 of the
Recitals - to "entitlement to present or immediate testamentary interests in the Coronado
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Condominium and the Clyde Residence." R. 83 (emphasis added). Appellants now lay
claim to the same "testamentary interests" that were stated in the Agreement's Recitals
and then voided, first by a specific provision addressing those properties and then again
by the general release. And even if arguendo Appellants' claims to be current Trust
beneficiaries are not identical to their prior claims to have "testamentary interests" in the
properties, they are surely "related to" them and thus still barred by the Settlement
Agreement.
3.

The Settlement Agreement Effectively Amended the Trust;
Alternatively, the Settlement Agreement Voided Appellants' Right
to Specific Properties Within the Trust.

As a practical matter, the effect of the Settlement Agreement was to amend the
Trust so as to remove Scott and Debra as beneficiaries. That Clyde did not formally
amend the Trust document itself is irrelevant. Where, as here (R. 23-10), the terms of a
revocable trust do not provide an exclusive means for amendment, Utah law permits
amendments by any method evincing the settlor's clear intent to do so. Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii). Given the express and sweeping language of the Settlement
Agreement's releases, there can be little doubt that Clyde intended to terminate
Appellants' testamentary interests in the condominium and residence.
Alternatively, even assuming for the sake of argument that Appellants'
testamentary status as Trust beneficiaries somehow survived the Settlement Agreement
(it didn't), their interests in the condominium or residence itself surely did not. This is a
subtle but important distinction. It is possible for someone to remain a trust beneficiary
while at the same time having no interest in particular properties within the trust estate.

For example, a beneficiary can voluntarily relinquish his interest in a specific trust
property without voiding his interest in others At a minimum, that is what happened
here. Clyde's Trust was setup to receive additional properties. R. 23. Under this
alternative reading, the Settlement Agreement left Appellants as Trust beneficiaries of
whatever other properties might be in the Trust Estate at the time of Clyde's death, but
stripped them of any right or interest in the condominium and residence.
To be clear, Mona advances this solely as an alternative argument, not as the best
reading of the Settlement Agreement. The important point is that however their interests
are characterized - present, future, contingent, testamentary, etc. - the Agreement
expressly voided all of Appellants' interests in the disputed properties as of the date of
execution.
4.

Clyde's Right to Dispose of His Property Does Not Resurrect
Appellants' Voided Property Interests.

Appellants' argument largely turns on a provision in the Settlement Agreement
affirming Clyde's right to dispose of his property as he pleases. Paragraph 5 of the C&A
section states that the "Agreement shall not, in any manner, restrict, impair, or limit
Clyde's right or ability to distribute any of his property" through any means he chooses.
R. 82, ^ 5. Appellants argue that they must be Trust beneficiaries because Clyde had the
right to remove them from the Trust but didn't. See Applts' Brf, at 26-29. Of course,
that assumes they still had an interest in the Trust or its properties when Clyde died. But
as explained, they didn't: the Settlement Agreement voided any such "testamentary
interests" that may have existed, effectively amending the Trust to remove Appellants as
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beneficiaries of the two properties. There was no need for the elderly Clyde to exercise
his right to do something that the Settlement Agreement had already done.
Moreover, this reading of the Settlement Agreement is consistent with two
documents that state Clyde's clear intent to cut off Appellants' interests in the
condominium and the residence and give those properties to Mona. R. 112, 110-08.
Those documents reinforce the conclusion that Clyde did not even want those properties
in the Trust corpus. See, e.g., R. 109. ("I do not want my Condominium and my home in
the trust. . . . I want [Mona] to be able to enjoy the condominium after I am gone just as
we have enjoyed it together for these many years. I give her my Condominium in
Coronado. I also give her my home in Orem. It will give the security she will need when
I am no longer here to take care of her.").10
In short, the Settlement Agreement means what it says. Prior to the Agreement,
Appellants asserted present and testamentary interests in the Coronado Condominium and
Clyde Residence. In exchange for valuable consideration, Appellants agreed to both
specific and sweeping provisions that terminated any such interests. This Court should
reject Appellants' efforts to revive rights and claims they plainly relinquished in a
comprehensive settlement.
10

Clyde signed these documents, which Appellants' themselves submitted as evidence
attached to their memorandum in opposition to Mona's motion to dismiss. R. 113-109.
The later of the two documents, an April 3, 2001 declaration, was also properly notarized.
R. 109. In their Complaint, Appellants brought specific claims challenging the validity of
these documents. On appeal, they also submit the Jeffs affidavit to contradict them.
However, as explained, Appellants have abandoned their claim challenging those
documents and the Jeffs affidavit may not be considered on appeal. As a result, the
validity of the documents is no longer in question. They are clear evidence of Clyde's
real intent.
a

III.

Mona Is Entitled To Attorney's Fees Regardless Of The Outcome Of This
Appeal.
Appellants do not dispute the right of the prevailing party to obtain attorney's fees

under the Settlement Agreement. They merely argue that the award of attorney's fees
should be reversed because Mona should not have prevailed in the district court. To the
extent Mona is correct and prevails in this appeal, the award of attorney's fees necessarily
stands.
But even if this Court should accept Appellants' arguments and reverse the
decision below, Mona would still be entitled to some attorney's fees. As noted,
Appellants brought many more claims than they have chosen to defend in this appeal.
Mona was forced to prepare extensive trial-court briefing demonstrating that the
Settlement Agreement bars those claims. See R. 108-66; 167-52. The district court
ultimately agreed with Mona and dismissed all of Appellants' claims. If this Court
reverses on the narrow grounds that Appellants have raised in this appeal, Mona is still
entitled to her attorney's fees on all claims where she was the prevailing party.
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CONCLUSION
The district court's decision should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Oral argument is requested to assist the Court in addressing the factual and legal
issues presented on appeal.
DATED this " ? ^ d a y of November, 2005.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Bensorf'L. Hathaway
Alexander Dushku
Karina Landward
Attorneys for Appellee Mona Vincent Lunceford
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employee's diesel asthma and emphysema were
separate and distinct conditions for purposes of
statute of limitations, where affidavit directly
contradicted
physician's
earlier
deposition
testimony and thus did not create genuine issue of
material fact. Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 6,
45 U.S.C.A. § 56; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 56,
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*309 On Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
Before NELSON, DAUGHTREY, and MOORE,
Circuit Judges.
DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, Harry Hayes, sued the defendants,
Norfolk Southern Corporation *310 and Norfolk
and Western Railway Company (collectively
Norfolk Southern), under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, for lung
damage caused by exposure to diesel fumes
throughout the course of his employment. Norfolk
Southern moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that Hayes's claim was barred by the
FELA's three-year statute of limitations. The
district court granted summary judgment for the
railroad based on a hospital x-ray report (submitted
for the first time with the Norfolk Southern's reply
brief) showing that Hayes had been diagnosed with
emphysema in both lungs in 1993, over one year
before he suffered two lung collapses, or
pneumothoraxes, and more than three years before
he filed suit. Hayes moved for reconsideration,
submitting for the first time an affidavit from his
doctor stating that his lung collapses were caused by
diesel asthma, not emphysema, and that the 1993
diagnosis of emphysema would not have put one on
notice of the entirely "separate and distinct
condition of diesel asthma." The district court
denied the motion for reconsideration, and the
plaintiff now appeals both that ruling and the
district court's grant of summary judgment to
Norfolk Southern.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Harry Hayes began working for Norfolk Southern
as a brakeman in 1978 and was promoted to

conductor *in 1989. He testified that throughout his
career on the railroad, he experienced eye irritation
and a sore throat as a result of on-the-job exposure
to diesel fumes. Claiming that, as a result of this
exposure, he eventually "became diseased, sick,
poisoned, and his internal organs, particularly his
lungs, were affected and weakened, so as to cause
him to suffer from a disease, all of which was the
direct result of the negligence of the Defendant,"
Hayes filed suit under the FELA on April 10, 1998.
Neither the initial complaint nor an amended
complaint specified the disease to which the
plaintiff was referring.
During
discovery,
the
railroad
served
interrogatories, one of which asked Hayes to state:
(a) whether you have ever been diagnosed by any
medical practitioner, or by any hospital, clinic or
other institution, as having chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, asthma, chronic bronchitis,
emphysema or tuberculosis, or any other cardiac
or pulmonary disease of any type; and (b) when
and by whom such diagnosis was made.
(Emphasis added.)
Hayes responded:
Yes. 1 was diagnosed with left sided
pneumothorax and emphysema in May 1995 by
Doctors Mousset and Horton. There may have
been others but I do not recall.
On March 16, 1999, Hayes verified the accuracy
of his answers to the defendant's interrogatories. In
his deposition, Hayes testified that, in addition to
the lung collapse and various ailments unrelated to
his lungs, he suffered from "emphysema," "chronic
bronchitis," and "maybe asthma." The briefs and
materials submitted by Hayes before he moved for
reconsideration do not mention the term "diesel
asthma," however.
Following Hayes's deposition, Norfolk Southern
moved for summary judgment. The railroad
argued that Hayes's pulmonary illness claim was
barred by the FELA's three-year statute of
limitations, because Hayes was put on notice of any
injuries from work-related diesel exposure by the
eye irritation and sore throat that he experienced
beginning in 1978 and attributed to defendant's
negligence. In his opposition brief, Hayes
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responded by arguing that his sore throat and eye
irritation were too fleeting and intermittent to *3U
have put a reasonable person on notice of any injury
beyond the "normal aches and pains following a
hard day's work." Hayes also noted that eye and
throat irritation would not put a reasonable person
on notice of a ''pulmonary condition." Hayes
emphasized that during this period he "did not
experience any respiratory problems" and that "[n]o
king symptoms were identified or diagnosed by
either Mr. Hayes or his physicians until 1995."
(Emphasis added.)
In its reply, the railroad submitted for the first time
a radiology report for Hayes from St. Charles
Hospital, dated December 31, 1993, stating that
"[b]olus emphysema is present in both lungs." The
railroad argued that this diagnosis was sufficient, as
a matter of law, to put a reasonable person on notice
of pulmonary injury. The railroad
further
contended that because Hayes admitted that he had
experienced "shortness of breath" before his lung
collapsed in 1995, and because he had attributed the
throat and eye irritation he had experienced since
1978 to inhalation of diesel fumes, he was--or
should reasonably have been—on notice of both his
injury and its cause since 1993, more than three
years before he filed suit.
Two weeks after Norfolk Southern submitted .its
reply brief but eight days before the district court
granted summary judgment, Norfolk Southern
deposed Dr. Hanna, the plaintiffs family doctor
from 1989 to 1996. [FN1] Dr. Hanna testified that
Hayes's lung first collapsed in February or March
1995 and that Hayes experienced a second lung
collapse in May 1995. Dr. Hanna noted that
"[e]mphysema by definition is loss of lung tissue"
and that within a few weeks after Hayes was
diagnosed with emphysema, he discussed the
seriousness of the condition with Hayes by showing
him the December 1993 chest x-ray on which the
emphysema diagnosis was based. According to Dr.
Hanna, by 1993 Hayes had already lost "a lot" of
lung tissue because "you can lose quite a bit [of
lung tissue] before you can actually make the
diagnosis on the x-ray."

FN1. Although Hayes had named Dr.
Hanna as an expeit witness in May 1999,
both parties acknowledged that they were
unable to locate Dr. Hanna before the
November 1999 deposition.
Dr. Hanna also testified that in 1994, about one
year before Hayes's lung first collapsed, he
prescribed medication for Hayes's lung condition.
He told Hayes that his emphysema was potentially
severe enough to cause a spontaneous lung collapse,
and he discussed with Hayes the lifestyle changes
he would need to take to "stop the progression of
his emphysema" and to lessen this risk of collapse.
Among the lifestyle factors that Dr. Hanna and
Hayes discussed were Hayes's work conditions,
including his exposure to diesel fumes at work.
According to Dr. Hanna, Hayes "felt that his
smoking played a role [in his emphysema], but he
felt like it didn't play as much of a role as some of
the other exposures to some of the other stuff in the
yard." In fact, Hayes specifically complained of
and demonstrated concern about his exposure to
diesel exhaust. Although Dr. Hanna expressed
uncertainty in his deposition as to whether Hayes
first mentioned his concerns about diesel exhaust
exposure "just prior to or just following [Hayes's]
initial lung collapse," Dr. Hanna testified that he
"most certainly" discussed with Hayes the need to
avoid
exposure
to
potentially
aggravating
conditions-including "toxic elements," "airborne
irritants" and "petro chemicals"—before Hayes's
lung collapsed in 1995.
In granting summary judgment for the defendant,
the district court determined that Hayes's claim for
pulmonary injury "arose, at the latest, when he was
diagnosed *312 with emphysema" and thus was
barred by FELA's statute of limitations. However,
in making this determination, the district court did
not consider Dr. Hanna's deposition testimony
because the deposition transcript was not filed until
the week after summary judgment was entered.
Within
the
ten-day
period
specified
by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(e), Hayes filed a motion for
reconsideration. Some six weeks later, Hayes filed
a brief in support of his motion to reconsider that
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was accompanied by an affidavit from Dr. Hanna
dated December 28, 1999. Dr. Hanna's affidavit
stated in key part:
6. Mr. Hayes's lung condition was significantly
aggrevated [sic] in 1995, as evidenced by his
pneumothoraxes. This in my opinion was caused
primarily by the increased exposure to diesel
exhaust commencing in 1995 and continuing
thereafter.
8. Diesel asthma, as opposed to emphysema, are
two very separate and distinct medical conditions.
The fact that one may know that he has
emphysema, would not mean that he also would
know that he had diesel asthma....
9 The pneumothorax suffered by Mr. Hayes was
the result of the diesel asthma, and not
emphysema. In fact, diesel asthma had never
been diagnosed prior to 1995.

suit. Finally, Hayes argued that the district court
should have denied summary judgment because the
hospital record the defendant offered in support of
its motion was unauthenticated. Hayes did not
dispute the accuracy of the hospital record or deny
that he had emphysema in 1993.

In his brief in support of reconsideration, Hayes
introduced a variety of new arguments for why
summary judgment was improper and explained in a
footnote that he had not offered these arguments
before summary judgment because Norfolk
Southern had not submitted the 1993 hospital
record of his emphysema until its reply brief. This
contention overlooked, obviously, the plaintiffs
failure to answer completely and truthfully the
interrogatories and the questions about his medical
history.

Norfolk Southern responded that reconsideration
was unwarranted for several reasons, including the
fact that Hayes failed to demonstrate an intervening
change in the controlling law, that evidence not
previously available had become available, or the
necessity to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice, and therefore failed to meet the
Sixth Circuit's requirements for reconsideration
under Fed.R Civ.P. 59(e). The response also
pointed out that none of the plaintiffs pleadings or
evidence submitted before reconsideration had ever
mentioned "diesel asthma" and the newly-submitted
affidavit of Dr. Hanna was of doubtful credibility.
Finally, the railroad contended that the plaintiffs
new claim for damages for the aggravation of his
emphysema after 1995 should be rejected because it
*313 was raised for the first time on reconsideration
and was not supported by the law. In his reply,
Hayes argued for the first time that Dr. Hanna's
affidavit was in fact evidence "not previously
available" under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and repeated
the arguments made for the first time in his
reconsideration brief.

Hayes's
first
argument
on
motion
for
reconsideration was that there were actually two
separate and distinct medical claims at issue—"one
for diesel asthma and one for emphysema."
According to Hayes, the statute of limitations had
not run on the diesel asthma claim because Dr.
Hanna's affidavit stated that the lung collapses
Hayes suffered in 1995 "were the result of diesel
asthma, not emphysema." Second, Hayes argued
that "new injury caused by new negligence is
actionable" and that his emphysema claim was
based on "new acts of negligence" that occurred
within three years of the date he filed suit. Third,
Hayes argued that, at the very least, he was entitled
to recover for the aggravation of his emphysema
caused by the "continuing negligence" of the
railroad over the three year period before he filed

[1] The district court denied the plaintiffs motion
for reconsideration, ruling that:
[Hayes] does not allege mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. Nor does he
suggest that evidence has newly become available
to him which would require a different result.
Rather, the arguments he gives in his motion to
alter or amend amount to little more than a
disagreement with the Court's decision, and
advises the Court that it should—based on law,
cases and arguments he could have made in his
previous brief-change its mind.
"In the interest of clarifying the legal rule,"
however, the district court did address Hayes's new
argument that even if his pre-1995 injuries were
time-barred, he could recover for exacerbations to
earlier injuries because exacerbations were "new
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injuries." The district court held, correctly, that
this argument was without merit because "[i]t is
well established in the Sixth Circuit that a plaintiff
is barred from bringing a FELA claim more than
three years after the initial injury and its causes are
discovered, even if the injury was later worsened by
the same employer," citing h4ounts v Grand Trunk
W. R.R.Co., 198 F.3d 578, 581-83 (6th Cir.2000),
and Apancio v. Norfolk W Ry. Co, 84 F.3d 803,
814-15 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds,
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hayes repeats the arguments he made in
support of his motion for reconsideration, many of
which were made for the first time in conjunction
with the motion for reconsideration and are based
upon the deposition testimony and affidavit of Dr.
Hanna-evidence that was not submitted to the
district court until after summary judgment was
granted on the basis of the relevant statute of
limitations. As a result, we will address them in
relation only to the motion to reconsider and not to
our review of the district court's decision to grant
summary judgment to Norfolk Southern.
The Grant of Summary Judgment
[2][3] The FELA's statute of limitations provides
that "[n]o action shall be maintained unless
commenced within three years from the day the
cause of action accrued." 45 U.S.C. § 56. A cause
of action under the Act accrues "when a reasonable
person knows or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known of both the injury and
its governing cause." Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 814. We
have held that a plaintiffs claims are not barred by
the statute of limitations if the claims for which the
plaintiff is suing are "separate" and "distinct" from
earlier ailments outside the three-year limitations
period. See Id., 814-15. However, a plaintiff
cannot sue for mere "aggravations" or a pre-existing
condition of which he should reasonably have
known. See id.; see also Fonseca v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 246 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir.2001).
[4][5][6][7] Because the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, the defendant bears the initial

burden of demonstrating in a FELA case that the
statute of limitations has run. See Campbell v.
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co, 238 F.3d 772,
775 (6th Cir.2001). However, once *314 the
defendant produces evidence that a reasonable
person, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, would or should have known of the injury
and its cause more than three years before suit was
filed—for example, by pointing to a diagnosis of a
related injury-it becomes the plaintiffs duty to
present evidence to the contrary. See Mounts, 198
F.3d at 582. One way for the plaintiff to meet this
burden is to produce testimony or evidence that
demonstrates that the ailment he is suing for is
sufficiently "separate" and "distinct" from the initial
injury and that the initial injury would not have put
a reasonable person on notice. If, at the summary
judgment stage, the plaintiff fails to produce such
evidence, summary judgment for the defendant is
proper. See id.
[8] In this case, the railroad met its initial burden of
showing that Hayes was on notice of his pulmonary
injury more than three years before April 10, 1998,
by submitting the 1993 hospital medical record that
demonstrated that Hayes suffered from "bolus
emphysema in both upper lungs." Hayes did not
respond before summary judgment to the railroad's
argument that the emphysema diagnosis put him on
notice of the risk of pulmonary injury. He did not,
for example, say anything in his deposition or his
response to the relevant interrogatory to suggest that
the lung damage he suffered in 1995 was distinct
from—rather than an aggravation of-the emphysema
he suffered in 1993. In fact, Hayes did not mention
or otherwise admit to his 1993 emphysema
diagnosis at any time during his deposition or his
discovery answers, even when specifically asked.
Moreover, on appeal, Hayes does not seem to argue
that his lung collapse is an injury "separate" and
"distinct" from his emphysema; rather he argues
that his lung collapse was caused by "diesel
asthma," and that "diesel asthma" and "emphysema"
are the completely "separate" and "distinct"
conditions. Although Hayes argues on appeal that
he testified in his deposition that he did not notice
difficulty breathing until his lung collapsed in 1995,
in reality his testimony is contradictory on this
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point. This confused testimony is not enough to
establish that Hayes lacked notice of pulmonary
damage during the two years between the hospital's
diagnosis of emphysema in both lungs and his lung
first collapse. See Campbell, 238 F.3d at 776
(finding "disingenuous" plaintiffs claim that he
"had no idea" that the numbness in his hands was
related to work until several years after the
numbness began, and rejecting plaintiffs contention
that the district court erred in concluding that his
contradictory deposition testimony did not establish
a genuine issue of material fact).
Furthermore, even if Hayes himself did not notice
difficulty with his breathing until his lung collapsed
in 1995, he offers no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that his lung
collapse was anything other than an aggravation of
his emphysema. Although Hayes argues that he
testified "repeatedly" that his pulmonary injury was
worsened when the railroad changed its policies to
operate "long nose forward" in 1995, his deposition
testimony suggests only that the irritation to his eyes
and throat increased when the railroad began to
operate "long nose forward" in 1989 or 1990.
Finally, there is no concern in this case that a
reasonable person would fail to recognize the
seriousness of the initial diagnosis of emphysema
and attribute it to the "transient aches and pains
after a long day's work." See Fonseca, 246 F.3d at
592. A hospital diagnosis of emphysema in both
lungs is sufficiently serious to put a reasonable
person on notice of lung damage.
[9] Hayes argues that he cannot be blamed for
failing to provide evidence on summary judgment
that his illnesses were distinct because the
defendant submitted *315 the hospital record for
the first time in its reply brief. This argument is
meritless. If Hayes believed that he needed to
respond to the evidence offered in the defendant's
reply, it was his responsibility to ask the court for
leave to file a surrepiy. Hayes does not offer any
argument or evidence that suggests that he made
such a request. Moreover, Hayes is the party
responsible for failing to disclose the emphysema
report earlier in the proceedings. Hayes offers no
explanation for why he did not disclose this

information to the defendant when specifically
asked in Interrogatory # 7 whether he had ever been
"diagnosed by any medical practitioner, or by any
hospital, clinic or other institution, as having
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma ...or
any other cardiac or pulmonary disease of any type"
(emphasis added). Hayes cannot hide relevant,
harmful evidence in violation of the rules of
discovery and then claim unfair surprise when the
damning evidence is uncovered late in the
proceedings. Hence, we conclude that, in light of
the evidence before it at the time, the district court
did not err in granting summary judgment to the
defendant.
Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration
[10][11] The standard of review for a trial court's
denial of a motion for reconsideration of a grant of
summary judgment is generally de novo. See
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Limited Corp.,
951 F.2d 110, 112 (6th Cir.1991). However, we
review a district court's refusal to consider evidence
produced for the first time on a motion to
reconsider only for abuse of discretion. See Huff v
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 123 (6th
Cir.1982) (holding that district court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to consider on motion for
reconsideration evidence in an affidavit that was
"not newly discovered and [the] credibility [of
which] was doubtful").
[12] A trial court may grant reconsideration under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) for any of four reasons: (1)
because of an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) because evidence not previously available
has become available; (3) to correct a clear error of
law; or (4) to prevent manifest injustice. See
GenCorp, Inc. v. American Int'l Underwriters, 178
F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir.1999). "ft is wed
established ... that a district court does not abuse its
discretion in denying a Rule 59 motion when it is
premised on evidence that the party had in its
control prior to the original entry of judgment."
Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 358 (6th
Cir.1989).
[13] The district court dismissed Hayes's motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the plaintiff
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failed to "suggest that evidence has newly become
available to him which would require a different
result." Hayes argues on appeal that Dr. Hanna's
affidavit constitutes newly available evidence
because the parties had trouble locating Dr. Hanna.
Regardless of any such difficulty, we conclude that
the affidavit cannot be considered to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hayes's
lung collapse was caused by "separate" and
"distinct" disease of "diesel asthma" because it
directly contradicts Dr. Hanna's earlier deposition
testimony. See Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 814-15
(holding that plaintiffs affidavit that recanted his
earlier deposition testimony was properly struck and
therefore could not serve to create a genuine issue
of material fact), Farrell v. Automobile Club, 870
F.2d 1129, 1132 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
party who has been examined at length by
deposition may not rely on an affidavit filed to
contradict the deposition evidence to create a
genuine issue of fact in order to defeat summary
judgment).

that diesel asthma and emphysema were "very
separate and distinct medical conditions" and that
Hayes's lung collapse was "the result of the diesel
asthma, and not the emphysema."
In short, there is no basis on which to find that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to grant
the plaintiffs motion to reconsider.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
25 Fed.Appx. 308
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to
top)
00-3876 (Docket)
(Jul. 13,2000)
END OF DOCUMENT

The contradictions between Dr. Hanna's deposition
and his subsequent affidavit are *316 numerous.
For example, Dr. Hanna testified in his deposition
that Hayes's lung first collapsed in February or
March 1995; he stated in his affidavit that the first
lung collapse took place in April 1995. This
discrepancy does not appear to be an innocent
revision, given that Hayes did not file suit until
April 10, 1998. In his deposition, Dr. Hanna
explained that "[e]mphysema by definition is a loss
of lung tissue" and testified that he told Hayes in
1994 that his emphysema was potentially severe
enough to cause a spontaneous lung collapse. He
also testified that he prescribed medication and
discussed with Hayes the lifestyle changes he could
make to "stop the progression of his emphysema" so
as to lessen the risk of such a collapse, including the
elimination of exposure to harmful elements in the
workplace. Dr. Hanna's deposition testimony never
once mentioned the term "diesel asthma" or
suggested that Hayes's lung collapse was caused by
anything other than his emphysema. Since he did
not mention "diesel asthma" in his deposition, Dr.
Hanna understandably did not provide any
testimony that would support his later conclusion
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